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Moral Molecules, Modern 
Selves, and Our “Inner Tribe”
Lenny Moss
An Ethos of Ambiguity
We are almost certainly on the threshold of a new understanding of our nature as 
social beings, which is being provoked and informed by developments in psychology, 
biology, and the social sciences. Just how we interpret and assimilate these new find-
ings has become a topic of considerable controversy. Inasmuch as morality, however 
one defines it, has to do with how we treat each other, the stakes of this controversy 
are raised by its ostensibly moral and thereby also political implications. Less obvious, 
especially to the public, is the extent to which academic disciplinary statures and com-
mitments are also hanging in the balance. 
Our nature as social beings is ostensibly paradoxical. On the one hand, we are unques-
tionably social in nature. We are born dependent upon the care of others; we crave com-
panionship and often go to great lengths to avoid loneliness. Short of death or physical 
torture, enforced solitary confinement is considered the most severe and hateful punish-
ment that can be inflicted upon a human being. On the other hand, perceptions of indi-
viduality govern our life choices—we are seldom far from consulting our private interests 
when it comes to making decisions of any consequence. We find ourselves, as individuals, 
in an ongoing, pervasive, and often strenuous competition with the multitudes for status, 
recognition, and every good we seek and desire up to and including walking space on a 
busy urban sidewalk. We thus experience most of our fellow humans, most of the time, 
as potential impediments to outmaneuver and outdo in order to achieve our ends. The 
Enlightenment’s late-eighteenth-century “Sage of Königsburg,” Immanuel Kant, pithily 
referred to this seemingly contradictory state of aﬀairs as our “unsocial sociability.” 
Lenny Moss, a former Berkeley and UCSF molecular cell biologist and Notre Dame 
professor of philosophy, is presently living in London, lecturing at a British university, 
and working on a new book about the science and philosophy of “natural detachment 
and the emergence of normativity.” He is the author of What Genes Can’t Do (MIT Press).
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How we understand our unsocial sociability, even if just implicitly, is of no small 
consequence. Those for whom social life is nothing but some minimally constrained 
expression of Hobbes’s “war of all against all” are prone to act accordingly. For Kant 
the very possibility of having rational hope for the future of humanity required 
a story to tell about the place of our unsocial sociability, and all of the historical 
suﬀerings and depredations wrought by it, within a framework of possible human 
“development.” More simply stated, we need a way of understanding “human nature” 
that allows us to make sense of the evils in 
human history without foreclosing the pos-
sibility of seeing ourselves as moving toward 
improvement in general, and more specifi-
cally toward something like global peace 
and general human wellbeing. Kant helped 
himself to a providential outlook but in the 
form of a theoretical teleology. Kant analo-
gized the human species with an organism 
that, in eﬀect, undergoes “growing pains” 
on its developmental path toward maturity. 
Just as the parts of an organism are always responding to the forces and factors of 
their immediate environment, and yet all told are contributing to the developmental 
ends of the organism, individual people live for the most part in their local world pur-
suing individual ends constitutive of a developmental trend in human history. Kant’s 
idea was that our unsocial sociability, our individualistic will to get ahead of each 
other, played out at the macro-level as an impetus for the further cultivation of the 
species, technologically, culturally, etc. The down side of course was that our unsocial 
sociability also resulted in massive amounts of human cruelty and immiseration. 
For Kant, these events, while morally uncondonable, were, as learning experiences, 
unavoidable parts of human self-development. Only by force of painful experience 
would humanity learn the value of peaceful co-existence. Sadly, the two-plus centu-
ries since have not easily lent themselves to confidence in a steady, progressive, human 
learning curve. 
Two of the key elements of Kant’s story—the idea that our social behavior is 
driven by inherent species proclivities and his providential/teleological assumption 
that we are invested with these proclivities for a reason—may not, on closer exami-
nation, look as foreign as one may initially have imagined. In place of talk about 
inherent proclivities, we now have talk about genes and chemical messengers. In 
place of a providential account of why (and to what end) we have the proclivities we 
do, we now have evolutionary arguments about why (and to what end) we have the 
genes and chemical messengers that we do. How to best interpret the significance of 
evolution, genetics, and neurochemistry for our understanding of human sociality, 
morality, and the implications for human conduct, however, is where present con-
troversies first begin. 
…we need a way of understanding 
“human nature” that allows us to 
make sense of the evils in human 
history without foreclosing the 
possibility of seeing ourselves as moving 
toward improvement in general…
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The Chemistry of Cooperation
For some, the very notion that a piece of chemistry could aﬀect our moral behavior 
suggests a serious blow to the presumed sanctity of human moral judgment. The dust 
jacket of a recent popular book by economist and neuroscientist Paul Zak does little to 
dispel such anxieties, indeed quite the contrary.1 If the title, The Moral Molecule, was 
not sensational enough, we are further informed that it is “The New Science of What 
Makes Us Good or Evil.” Before even delving into the findings of the book, it might 
be instructive to consider under what circumstances, that is, on the basis of what kind 
of scientific evidence, would the integrity (or “autonomy”) of morality be undermined? 
Surely the mere fact that we are flesh and blood creatures; that when we feel, think, 
and move, chemicals in our brain and body are at play; and that one of these chemicals 
happens to be a nine-amino acid peptide called oxytocin, should not come as a shock 
nor necessarily constitute a challenge. But then what would? 
If we are to take the issue of a challenge seriously, then we first need to distinguish 
between a strong and a weak challenge. The strong challenge would be based upon evi-
dence that what we have assumed to be the “logos” of moral reason is to be accounted 
for on the basis of the “logos” of neurochemistry. If it could be shown that moral judg-
ment is based upon a predictable (and potentially controllable) causal chain in which 
the expression of oxytocin realizes and defines moral conviction, then claims to the 
integrity and autonomy of moral judgment would indeed be defeated. When it came 
to determining “what counts” as moral, oxytocin, “the moral molecule,” would have the 
last word; there would not, and could not, be any higher court of appeal. As we will see, 
there is no indication in The Moral Molecule that author 
Paul Zak ever even imagined that this strong challenge 
could be true. 
The weak challenge is not about what determines 
the meaning of “moral,” and so does not question our 
claim to the integrity and autonomy of the very idea 
of moral judgment, but rather pertains to what deter-
mines our propensity to act morally. The meaning of 
the dust jacket boast that The Moral Molecule will reveal “The New Science of What 
Makes Us Good or Evil” can be read either way, strong or weak, and one has to wonder 
whether a bit of sensationalizing conflation hasn’t become stock-in-trade of the market-
ing (and even self-marketing) of an incipient “science of morality” industry. This is not 
to say, however, that the “weak challenge” is not potentially significant. 
Let’s consider two extreme versions of what the weak challenge could amount to 
from opposite ends of the possibility spectrum. On one side, it is our entire genetic and 
epigenetic endowment and our entire life history that determines our propensity to act 
morally in any given situation. No one aspect of any of this, taken out of the whole 
context, is decisive in itself. All of the chemicals, synapses, and reaction patterns that 
our life-history has given shape to and that we are in turn shaped by are all reciprocally 
dependent upon each other for constituting the kind of being, moral and otherwise, 
that we are. In this view oxytocin may typically be one of the many chemicals of which 
…on the basis of what kind of 
scientific evidence, would the 
integrity (or “autonomy”) of 
morality be undermined? 
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we are composed but is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for moral behavior. On the 
other end of the spectrum, oxytocin, as the reputed “moral molecule,” could be both 
necessary and suﬃcient for moral behavior, which is to say that there is no moral behav-
ior without oxytocin expression, and no failure to act morally in its presence. If this 
were the case and if, for example, any exposure to oxytocin resulted in moral behavior, 
and any lack of it resulted in an absence of moral behavior, then the moral relevance of 
one’s upbringing and life-history would be subject to question. The evidence provided 
by Paul Zak suggests that, as is often the case, the truth lies somewhere between these 
extremes. 
The keynote findings for Zak’s claims about oxytocin were derived from an experi-
ment in economic behavior that challenged “rational choice” (that is, self-interest maxi-
mization) predictions. Participants were divided into an “A” group and a “B” group. 
Everyone was given $10 to begin with. Members of the A group had to decide whether 
to transfer some of their money to a member of the B group. Any money transferred 
would triple in amount for the chosen B group member. So if A transferred $2 to B, 
then A would have $8 and B would have $16. B then had the option of showing grati-
tude to A by transferring some of this gain back to A. If B transferred $3 back to A, 
then they both wound up better than they started. The game was played anonymously 
so A did not know the identity of B, and vice versa. In transferring money to B, A had 
to engage in an act of trust that B would transfer money back despite the lack of any 
self-interest B had in doing so. B had nothing to gain by returning any of the money 
and had nothing to lose in declining to do so. Zak took blood samples for hormone 
analysis at diﬀerent stages of the experiment. 
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As one of his controls, Zak also compared findings from a parallel experiment but 
one in which the transfer of money from A to B was determined not by A’s trust that 
B would reciprocate, but randomly by the blind selection of balls from “the Walmart 
Bucket” with numbers on them. What Zak found was that the experience of being 
trusted (to reciprocate) by members of group B, resulted in a spike in their oxytocin 
levels, which in turn correlated with a propensity to return some of the money to the 
A member. Zak writes, 
when participants received transfers of money based on someone’s deci-
sion to trust them, their oxytocin levels were 50 percent higher than 
the levels of those who received money based on the Walmart bucket 
and the random luck of the draw.  Those who knew their windfall was 
based on another player’s faith in them also returned almost twice as 
much–41 percent of their new total–compared to 25 percent–by those 
whose good fortune was random.2
What these findings suggest is that there is a biologically based propensity for 
responding to the experience of being trusted with generosity and that this dynamic is 
mediated by the chemical messenger oxytocin. Much of the penumbra (especially the 
commercial penumbra, including dust jackets) of recent neurochemistry has traded 
on the inference that the new sciences will undermine assumptions about our human-
ity in some way, such as by challenging the idea that we are moral agents. The use of 
the two extreme cases (of the “weak challenge”) 
discussed above was meant to help facilitate our 
assessment of this possibility. So what is the 
verdict? The first implication of Zak’s work is 
that, if anything, we are constitutionally more 
humane—so surely not less human—than 
economists and others have imagined inasmuch 
as repaying trust with good will and generosity 
appears to be part of our “biological nature.” 
But does the fact that our acts of human 
decency (or at least some of them) are mediated 
by a key chemical messenger reduce the locus 
of moral agency from that of the complex indi-
viduals we take ourselves to be, down to some 
form of unconscious chemical mechanism? If 
the latter of the two extreme cases above was supported by the evidence, then the 
answer would be “yes” because it would suggest that what is distinctive about each of us 
as individuals, and our life histories, would be irrelevant. Further findings reported by 
Zak indicate that this is not the case. A spike in oxytocin is not necessarily a suﬃcient 
basis for acting morally, nor is the capacity to respond to an oxytocin spike in an empa-
thetic fashion independent of one’s life history. A working oxytocin-empathy system is 
a contingent outcome of a life-history that supports it. Studies have shown that women 
who have been subject to protracted abuse can lose the capacity to respond empatheti-
cally to an oxytocin spike (indeed in some cases trustworthiness even becomes inversely 
But does the fact that our acts of 
human decency (or at least some 
of them) are mediated by a key 
chemical messenger reduce the 
locus of moral agency from that of 
the complex individuals we take 
ourselves to be, down to some form 
of unconscious chemical mechanism?
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proportional to the amplitude of the oxytocin spike). Children deprived as infants of a 
loving environment (such as in an under-staﬀed orphanage) fail to develop a working 
oxytocin system for some time even after being taken into a caring home. 
Experimental findings about the role of oxytocin in eliciting empathetic, ostensibly 
moral behavior, and the conditions which nourish it, are not at all contrary to our best 
intuitions about what it means to live a “good life” and may in fact help us better real-
ize what we already knew. A chronic cortisol-releasing stress response, for example, will 
knock out the oxytocin system. Those who are at 
greatest risk of this are not the classic overachievers 
but rather those, like the high-responsibility, low-
influence, middle managers described in the clas-
sic Whitehall study (which inversely correlated the 
mortality rates of over 18,000 male civil servants 
over a ten-year period with their grade levels), 
who live their lives with chronic frustration and 
bottled-up anger. Testosterone elicits a combative 
response and so has something like the opposite 
eﬀect as that of oxytocin. It has been shown that 
even as spectators at an athletic competition, both men and women undergo a testos-
terone surge when their team wins. One may well wonder whether children whose 
principal daily experience is centered on the pursuit of testosterone spikes from video-
game combat may be at risk of failing to developmentally acquire the full capacity for 
empathic relationships. 
What inspired Paul Zak, and others, to associate the influence of oxytocin with 
“morality” as opposed to something less provocative like “good feelings” is its correla-
tion with actions that are not in one’s own ostensible self-interest. To the extent that 
such correlations continue to be supported by the evidence, they do present a challenge 
to those who would hold that moral action can occur only on the basis of adherence 
to a principle (or a commandment) and only by force of explicit intent, that is, never 
through mere inclination guided by feeling. That our aﬀective, pre-theoretic, perhaps 
even pre-linguistic natures include propensities for acting selflessly, does not mean, 
however, that moral reflection can be declared redundant and tossed out the window. 
Indeed, learning how to overcome the outdated and simplistic binaries of mind versus 
body, reason versus emotion, etc., may prove to be the most important lesson of our 
encounters with new “sciences of the social.” 
The evolutionary antecedents to the oxytocin molecule were molecules associated 
with promoting receptivity to copulation in marine vertebrates. For oxytocin to come 
to promote selfless, that is, ostensibly moral behavior in ancestral humans to make any 
evolutionary sense, one has to imagine that a) our human ancestors were members of 
tightly knit groups, and b) evolutionary success over long periods of time had at least 
as much to do with competition among groups as it did among individuals within a 
group. Selfless behavior within a group competing with other groups could well con-
tribute to evolutionary success but only so long as the selflessness was limited to fellow 
members of one’s group. Reflections such as these led to experiments carried out by 
Selfless behavior within a 
group competing with other 
groups could well contribute to 
evolutionary success but only so 
long as the selflessness was limited 
to fellow members of one’s group.
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a psychologist at the University of Amsterdam to discover evidence for what has also 
been referred to as “the dark side of oxytocin” or more technically as “parochial altru-
ism.” Dutch students tested on the standard moral dilemma of having to sacrifice one 
person in order to save five, when dosed with oxytocin, were “far more likely to sacrifice 
the Muhammads than the Maartens.”3 Other experiments likewise associated oxytocin 
exposure with favoring members of the “in-group.”4
At the end of the day, “the lesson” of “the moral molecule” appears to be that we 
are the hybrid descendants of an ancestry that has bequeathed to us a visceral proclivity 
for empathic feelings and selfless actions on behalf of those others we tacitly perceive as 
members of our in-group, a more individuated capacity for privileging our private inter-
ests, and the ability to cognitively reach beyond 
both the in-group and private interest in holding 
ourselves accountable to the force of moral argu-
ment, when such becomes explicit. Clearly, our 
ability to judge when oxytocin is and is not inducing 
moral behavior illustrates that we are not ultimately 
beholden to oxytocin-induced feeling to distinguish 
between the two; we have independent criteria for 
what counts as “moral.” But this by no means is meant to exclude the possibility that 
it was, in evolutionary terms, exactly the kind of deeply empathic feeling for a fellow 
member of one’s group that was the feedstock from which ideas of morality could have 
been abstracted and generalized. It is exactly this idea of the antecedence of moral emo-
tion to cognitive moral judgment that ethologist Frans de Waal has claimed in arguing 
that chimps, bonobos, and gorillas can be seen to display the pre-theoretic rudiments 
of morality in some of their social interactions.5 
Our Diﬀerence 
Is it, then, only language that clearly distinguishes human-level sociality from that of 
our closest primate relatives? In what could well be the most revolutionary work on the 
subject, coming out of the laboratory and studies of Michael Tomasello, the answer is 
a resounding “No!” The critical transition for Tomasello is the emergence of a capacity 
for “shared intentionality,” also known as “we-intentionality.” Crucially this is a capacity 
that is developmentally established in humans (and no other species) prior to language. 
Consider the following experiment. Twelve-month-old, pre-linguistic children were set 
up to observe an adult stapling papers and then leaving the room, after which another 
adult moved the stapler. The first adult returned and appeared to be flummoxed as 
to what happened to the stapler. Most of the children tested proceeded to try to help 
the adult by pointing to the new location of the stapler. In this simple act, the twelve-
month-old children, according to Tomasello, revealed a kind of social cognition that 
no other higher primate has ever achieved. The help-oriented pointing required an 
implicit understanding on the part of the infant that the adult understands that the 
infant understands the adult’s objectives and that the adult understands that the infant 
Is it, then, only language that 
clearly distinguishes human-level 
sociality from that of our closest 
primate relatives?
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is pointing to help. What even the pre-linguistic human can understand, and no other 
creature, so far as we know, can understand, is that “we” understand so and so, “we” 
have our attention directed to such and such object, “we” are engaged in pursuing a 
common goal, and normatively “we” know that we are accountable to each other when 
it comes to exiting from a shared “we” relationship. The distinctiveness of the capacity 
for “we-intentionality” reveals itself in practices of “informing,” as above, where only 
on the basis of a capacity for we-intentionality can pointing play the role that it does. 
Another kind of activity transformed by we-intentionality is that of sharing. In a 
revealing series of experiments, investigators compared the propensity of chimpanzees 
and young children to collaborate in pulling in a board containing either pre-divided 
parcels of food or an undivided parcel of food. In the latter case, the chimpanzees 
or the children would have to divide the food themselves. The chimpanzees but not 
the children showed a very strong preference for pulling in the boards with the food 
pre-divided, where the young children did not exhibit any such preferences at all. For 
the chimps, one can surmise, the undivided pool was a conflict waiting to happen. 
We-intentionality brings with it implicit norms of sharing, in the absence of which 
there can only be anticipation of conflict. “It is not that the children always divide the 
food equally. Sometimes one individual will take more than her share, but then the 
partner challenges her to square things up, which she almost always does.”6  
Language involves an implicit agreement to let an arbitrary signifier stand for some-
thing. Language involves convention, and convention requires shared-intentionality. 
Language and culture require a socio-cognitive infrastructure of shared-intentionality 
and a socio-aﬀective infrastructure of shared feeling and mutual trust. Studies on the 
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neurochemistry and on the cognitive psychology of human (and primate) coopera-
tion have come to point inexorably toward the primacy, specificity, and significance 
of the early hominid/human group. It has not been very long since sociobiologists 
and evolutionary psychologists took the social group as a background given that did 
not require any explanation and strove to characterize human psychology as the sum 
total of domain-specific functional “cognitive modules” (such as cheat detectors and 
high fertility-promising female 0.7 waist-to-hip ratios), naturally selected exclusively to 
advantage some individuals over other individuals within the group. Even within the 
world of evolutionary biology, the lock-hold of the paradigm of selfishness as the one-
and-only deep truth of evolution by natural selection has been giving way to renewed 
appreciation for the primacy of “the group” as a level of evolutionary selection…but 
not without a fight. 
Public Trust and Research Agendas 
In his 1987 book, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe, 
Russell Jacoby argued that Americans were seeing the last generation of thinkers 
who were oriented toward addressing the good of the general public, as opposed to 
an orientation shaped and mediated by the vicissitudes of disciplinary success. The 
public stature and visibility of a number of scientifically trained writers over the 
last few decades has been elevated by publicity given to challenges to the authority 
of evolutionary theory by biblical literalists and Christian conservatives. This has 
resulted in an increasing presence in the literary public sphere of books written 
by people from the natural sciences addressing the larger questions of human self-
understanding and right thinking. It might not even be too much of a stretch to sug-
gest that book jacket endorsements from Richard Dawkins, on one side of the pond, 
and Steven Pinker, on the other, have become for many a new Good Housekeeping 
seal of approval. On closer examination, however, some of Jacoby’s concerns might 
well merit revisiting. 
Hanging in the Balance
Although Darwin himself was a pluralist about the levels in the hierarchies of 
nature at which natural selection could take place, that is, individuals, groups, spe-
cies, etc., the last four decades saw a widespread agreement amongst neo-Darwinists 
that group selection was not likely to be a strong factor in evolution. Much of this 
discussion had to do with the challenge of accounting, in Darwinian terms, for the 
presence of members of so-called “eusocial” insect colonies who do not reproduce but 
whose eﬀorts are good for the reproduction of the group. A solution was proposed 
by the English mathematician Richard Hamilton, who, rather than moving up to the 
level of the group, moved down to the level of individual genes. His idea was that 
a gene expressed in a nonreproductive member of a group could still be favored by 
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natural selection if it was also present in closely related reproducing members of the 
group and that altruism of the former would support the enhanced fecundity of the 
latter. In this view, the nonreproducing individuals are seen as mere functionaries, 
directed by their genes, to serve the reproductive interests of their reproducing kin. 
Hamilton’s model was expressed as a mathematical inequality, whereby the gene is 
favored by natural selection if “r,” which is a measure of the relatedness of the repro-
ductive and nonreproductive individuals, is greater than its cost-to-benefit ratio. This 
model of evolution has been known as both “kin selection” and “inclusive fitness 
theory.” Hamilton was a young unknown at the time, and his big breakthrough was 
the at-first-reluctant acceptance of his work by the world’s leading expert on the biol-
ogy of the social insects, Harvard’s E. O. Wilson. Wilson not only embraced his work 
but was inspired by it to attempt to extrapolate some of its lessons to the understand-
ing of human sociobiology as well. 
Fast-forward three decades, and Wilson no longer feels that inclusive fitness the-
ory has made good on its promises. Subsequent findings of the correlation between 
the close genetic relationships of members of a group and the presence of a eusocial 
structure, for example, did not pan out. A eusocial group is one in which multiple 
generations remain together and a division of 
labor exists such that the members of the group 
perform functions for each other. As a function-
ally interconnected whole, a eusocial group can 
be thought of as a kind of “super-organism” 
that competes with other super-organisms and 
benefits from traits that promote intra-group 
cooperation and cohesion. Group selection, for 
Wilson, was back on the table for understanding 
the evolution of eusociality in insects and also 
for being far and away the best account of homi-
nid/human evolution. From the point of view 
of Wilson and others who now countenance the 
power of group selection in evolution, competi-
tion among individuals in a group is still a fac-
tor in evolution; it just depends on how stringent the pressure on the group is to 
function as a tightly integrated super-organism. As natural selection can variably 
take place at either the individual or the group level, this alternative to inclusive 
fitness theory is called “multilevel selection theory.” By Wilson’s lights, there was 
an inevitable balance between the influence of the two. Where Darwinism predicts 
that selfish individuals will reproductively win out over altruistic individuals, it also 
predicts that groups of nonselfish, cooperative individuals will outcompete groups 
of selfish, untrustworthy individuals. Once again, what begins to take shape is a 
hybrid legacy. Perhaps a new vision of the basis of Kant’s unsocial sociability is 
coming into view? 
Where Darwinism predicts 
that selfish individuals will 
reproductively win out over 
altruistic individuals, it also 
predicts that groups of nonselfish, 
cooperative individuals will 
outcompete groups of selfish, 
untrustworthy individuals. 
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From the Hearth
Wilson’s latest book, The Social Conquest of Earth, culminates in an attempt at 
oﬀering an up-to-date account of the origins and meaning of human nature.7 He has 
now taken on-board much of the recent work on phenotypic plasticity,8 epigenetics,9 
and a postgenomic appreciation for the evolutionary importance and complexity of 
gene regulation. Eusociality in insects begins with a shared nest that must be defended. 
Experiments have shown that a capacity for beginning to diﬀerentiate tasks within a 
nest can be “spring-loaded,” that is, already present as a potential response pattern latent 
in the pre-eusocial phenotype. The most likely early mutation that plays a significant 
role in the initiation of eusociality is not one that confers some kind of new information 
but rather a mutation that knocks out the gene that is critical for causing the queen to 
leave her nest and found a new one. 
In the case of early humans, the parallel vision is one that locates a likely transition 
in eusociality with the initiation of permanent encampments built around a controlled 
campfire by Homo erectus over a million years ago. The common need to share and 
protect the campsite and to cooperate in the procurement of meat for cooking would 
have provided a context favoring an advanced level of sociality. Just as with insects, but 
far more so, the Homo erectus genome would have already had a significant capacity for 
adaptive phenotypic adjustment prior even to any genetic changes. Following the lead 
of Tomasello, Wilson now sees the attainment of the capacity for shared intentional-
ity as the sine qua non of the human line of evolution up to and including being the 
precondition for the possibility of spoken language. The capacity of group members to 
share objects of mental attention, hold goals in common, and to hold themselves (and 
each other) accountable to implicitly shared norms are surely the kind of skills and 
attributes that could enhance the survival of a hominid/human group. 
Dissent or Descent?
While there is a growing consensus amongst evolutionary theorists that both inclu-
sive fitness theory and multilevel selection theory can eﬀectively mathematically model 
the same range of phenomena,10 many who have worked with the former have taken 
exception to Wilson now giving inclusive fitness theory very short shrift.11 For Dawkins 
and Pinker, however, one will have to surmise that much more than a failure to be 
ecumenical is at stake. In a lengthy review of The Social Conquest of Earth entitled “The 
Descent of Edward Wilson,” Dawkins actually goes so far as to discourage his read-
ers from reading the book.12 Paraphrasing Dorothy Parker, he closes by exhorting his 
reader that “this is not a book to be tossed lightly aside. It should be thrown with great 
force.”13 Earlier he had opined that Wilson’s former collaborator Bert Hölldobler was 
“yet another world expert who will have no truck with group selection,”14 apparently 
without ever asking Hölldobler, whose own response to this was that “almost everyone 
agrees that selection can also operate on the level of the colony. Indeed a colony can 
serve as a vehicle of genes, and one can model this by employing inclusive fitness theory 
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or multilevel selection theory.”15 Pinker, who refers to group selection as a “scientific 
dust bunny, a hairy blob in which anything having to do with ‘groups’ clings to any-
thing to do with ‘selection’” is hardly any more civil. But why such vitriol against a 
fellow scientist? 
For many members of the public for whom Dawkins and Pinker have come to 
serve as arbiters of (nonfiction) literary good taste, the battle lines were understood 
as that of scientifically informed reason versus anti-scientific myth or prejudice. What 
may be less obvious to readers is the extent to which their professional careers, and 
public standpoints, have been very closely tied to a very specific and increasingly insecure 
concept of “the gene.” Dawkins’s very name is virtually synonymous with the concept 
of “the selfish gene” and all that can be derived from that concept. But when Dawkins 
wrote his career-making manifesto, molecular biologists believed that a large part of the 
genome was “junk” or “selfish” DNA that served no purpose in the cell other than its 
own perennial replication. In the wake of the revelations of the human genome project, 
it has become increasingly clear that the noncoding parts of the genome are critical for 
regulation as well as being the source of much evolutionary innovation through reshuf-
fling. Molecular biologists no longer speak of junk DNA. Multilevel selection theory 
now threatens to put the nails in the coﬃn of the selfish gene concept. 
When DNA sequences associated in some way with increased cooperation within 
a successful group increase in frequency in the next generation, are they still selfish 
genes? Can the ascription “selfish” even retain any non-trivial meaning if its putative 
phenotypic contributions are not in any straightforward way “selfish”? Wilson has sug-
gested that the assessment of a gene’s relative selfishness or generosity should come after, 
not before, one knows for what it has been graced by natural selection. For Dawkins 
(as well as for Pinker), such talk is heresy. They hold as a first and inalienable principle 
that natural selection means “gene-level selection” and that gene-level selection is “self-
ish.” Once upon a time, Dawkins looked at evolution heuristically “from the gene’s 
eye view,” but at some point soon thereafter every other “eye view” somehow became 
condemned as an act of un-Darwinian apostasy. 
Pinker, a psychologist, has built a career on hypostatizing mental traits on the basis 
of the logic of gene-level selection. The genes-for this and genes-for that account that 
Pinker proposes bears no relationship to the actual findings of molecular biology, oﬀers 
few if any empirical examples of “real” genes to draw upon, and shows no awareness 
of new developments with respect to the findings of comparative genomics, “facilitated 
variation,”16 adaptive phenotypic plasticity, “evo-devo,”17 and so on. Pinker sums up 
his objection to group level selection (and thus multilevel selection) as follows:
I have argued that the concept of Group Selection has no useful role 
to play in psychology or social science. It refers to too many things, 
most of which are not alternatives to the theory of gene-level selection 
but loose allusions to the importance of groups in human evolution. 
And when the concept is made more precise, it is torn by a dilemma. 
If it is meant to explain the cultural traits of successful groups, it 
adds nothing to conventional history and makes no precise use of the 
actual mechanism of natural selection. But if it is meant to explain 
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the psychology of individuals, particularly an inclination for uncon-
ditional self-sacrifice to benefit a group of nonrelatives, it is dubious 
both in theory (since it is hard to see how it could evolve given the 
built-in advantage of protecting the self and one’s kin) and in practice 
(since there is no evidence that humans have such a trait).18
Pinker dismisses the theory of group selection because it is not doing the kind of 
work he wants done. But in assuming he knows what kind of work should be done 
in advance, he is begging all of the relevant questions. The new promise of group 
selection is not about being able to distinguish between cultures genetically but rather 
about being able to finally properly understand the basis of human culture as such. 
Like it or not, the basis of human culture, we increasingly see, has a great deal to 
do with the evolution of a socio-aﬀective/socio-cognitive infrastructure that opens up 
an enormous arc of possibility. Getting our best grasp on the needs, biases, and con-
straints of this open-ended, context-sensitive domain of bio-socio-cultural epigenesis 
is best served by an expansive and synthetic co-mingling of many sources of real 
data and insight, not by a narrowing censorious 
pre-screening in the name of “The Mechanism” 
of gene-level selection. With respect to the psy-
chology of individuals, Pinker helps himself to 
the idea that the mark of group level selection 
would be something like a spontaneous propen-
sity for individuals to blow themselves up on 
behalf of the group (and he insists that suicide 
bombers have been persuaded in the name of 
their kin, not dictated by a gene for altruism). 
But this stark characterization of what the fruits 
of group selection would look like is a canard of 
its opponents. 
As Wilson has suggested, what group selection predicts and helps to account for 
is not “altruism” as it has been defined by selfish-gene theorists but “groupishness.” 
The ongoing findings about the role of oxytocin in the promulgation of community 
trust and good will, but also of the possibility of ethnocentric bias, should provide 
an excellent venue for exploring the evolution of human groupishness, but let us 
consider another. In a 2008 study, Jessica Nolan and others found that, unbe-
knownst to 810 participants from California, what most influenced their behavior 
with respect to energy conservation was not (as they believed) all the good reasons 
for conserving energy, but rather unconscious knowledge of what their neighbors 
were doing (which they rated as their least important consideration).19 Studies 
like these are rife in the social psychology literature, and while they do not have 
the pizzazz of the discovery of, say, a gene for self-immolation, they are crucial for 
understanding much of the reality of how we humans go about our daily lives, in 
most places, most of the time.20
Like it or not, the basis of human 
culture, we increasingly see, has a 
great deal to do with the evolution 
of a socio-aﬀective/socio-cognitive 
infrastructure that opens up an 
enormous arc of possibility.
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Coda
Multilevel selection may be able to account for the paradox of our “unscocial socia-
bility.” Or, it could be that as we became even more skilled as members of a group with 
the capacity, built on shared intentionality, to see ourselves from the point of view of 
the general other, and thereby not only to be normatively accountable but critically and 
reflectively accountable, that a self-ego emerged and with it the epigenetic possibility for 
radical individuation. In any event, it seems likely that we are at once creatures of the 
ancestral group and yet individuals whose detachment from enclosure within the group 
is irreversible. Nor have we yet been able to jump out of our ancestral skins and into the 
full realization of the universal autonomy that we project in our regulative idealizations 
of moral and legal justice. The social sciences and normative social theory may be able 
to glean from the new sciences of human nature the need to countenance the modern 
human as a hybrid creature…and a work in progress. 
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